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Abstract
Labour market regulations aimed at enhancing job-security are dominant in several OECD countries. 
These regulations seek to reduce dismissals of workers and fluctuations in employment. The main 
theoretical contribution is to gauge the effects of such regulations on labour demand across 
establishment sizes. In order to achieve this, we investigate an optimising model of labour demand 
under uncertainty through the application of real option theory. We also consider other forms of 
employment which increase the flexibility of the labour market. In particular, we are modelling the 
contribution of temporary employment agencies (Zeitarbeit) allowing for quick personnel adjustments 
in client firms. The calibration results indicate that labour market rigidities may be crucial for 
understanding sluggishness in firms´ labour demand and the emergence and growth of temporary work.  
Keywords: Labour Demand, Dismissal Protection Legislation, Firing Costs, Real Options,
Temporary Work Agencies, Temporary Employment
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11. Introduction
In many continental European countries unemployment appears to reside at a persistently high level, 
with no improvement in sight. Therefore, protection of workers from dismissals has become an 
important topic of labour markets reforms in many European countries. According to the World Bank 
Doing Business database, countries vary greatly with respect to the flexibility of labour market 
regulations.1 These regulations can be provided through legislation, collective bargaining agreements or 
judicial practices and court interpretations of legislative provisions. According to the World Bank, for 
example, severance pay in Germany is set at 66.7 weekly wages, in the Netherlands at 16.0 weekly 
wages, in the UK at 33.5 weekly wages, and Portugal requires 98.0 weekly salaries as the standard 
compensation. On the contrary, the corresponding number for the U.S. is 0.0. Given these differences 
the pros and cons of deregulating labour markets are at the heart of the employment debate in many 
countries.
An important characteristic of dismissal protection laws or collective agreements in advanced 
economies is that rules for dismissing redundant workers are differentiated by establishment size and 
the provisions are more stringent above certain employee thresholds. In Germany, the threshold in the 
“Protection Against Dismissal Act” (Kündigungsschutzgesetz) was changed several times. During the 
1990s, the threshold was changed twice, once from 5 to 10 (full-time equivalent) employees in October 
1996 by the then chancellor Helmut Kohl and then back again to 5 employees in January 1999 under 
chancellor Schröder. Finally, in January 2004 the threshold was moved once again from 5 to 10 
employees. The size exemption criteria apply to establishments, not firms. An establishment is a 
production unit at a single location which can financially and/or legally belong to a larger firm. 
Establishments below the threshold are allowed to operate under the far less stringent rules of the 
German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch). The corresponding Austrian threshold level for 
application of dismissal protection is 5 workers, while no such thresholds currently exist in the UK and 
the Netherlands.2
The potential importance of the 5-employee-threshold vs. 10-employee-threshold in the “Protection 
Against Dismissal Act” results from the fact that Germany´s economy is dominated by small and 
                                                          
1 The World Bank Doing Business scoreboard on the flexibility of labour regulations and their enforcement is 
available at www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreTopics/HiringFiringWorkers/. The table provides five indicators for a 
worker in a large manufacturing firm who has been with the company for many years. (1) Difficulty of hiring a 
new worker (Difficulty of Hiring Index); (2) restrictions on expanding or contracting the number of working hours 
(Rigidity of Hours Index); (3) difficulty and expense of dismissing a redundant worker (Difficulty of Firing); (4) 
an average of the three indices (Rigidity of Employment Index), and (5) cost of a redundant worker, expressed in 
weeks of wages (Firing Costs). Higher values in the table indicate more rigid regulations.  Also see Botero et al. 
(2004). The OECD has also published indices of employment protection, again showing less protection in 
English-speaking countries [see OECD (2004)].
2 Apart from national legislation, the EU acquis also sets thresholds proportional to firms’ employment level, by 
which individual dismissals become collective dismissals with corresponding effects on firing costs (up and down, 
depending on the regulation on each type of dismissal in each country).
2medium-sized firms, the Mittelstand, which has often been described as the backbone of the German 
economy.3
Our aim is to model the effects of such thresholds upon labour demand. To this end, we construct a real 
options model of labour demand with threshold effects. In particular, we are modelling the contribution 
of temporary employment agencies which represent a key response to the flexibility needs of firms and 
help firms to cope with fluctuations in demand in a more global and fast-changing environment. 
Temporary agency work can broadly be defined as a temporary employment relationship between a 
temporary work agency, which is the employer, and a worker, where the latter is assigned to work for, 
and under the control of a firm making use of his/her services.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops the baseline theoretical model of 
employment dynamics and demonstrates the implications of various policy reforms with illustrative 
numerical examples. Section 3 extends the model to allow for the contribution of temporary 
employment agencies which represent a key response to the flexibility needs of firms and help them to 
cope with fluctuations in demand in a fast-changing environment. In Section 4, a further perspective on 
the adjustment of employment is obtained by simulating the dynamic employment patterns of the 
models. Section 5 concludes. Two appendices at the end of the paper collect some proofs and technical 
derivations which are rather involved. Readers who are not interested in the nuts and bolts of the 
derivations can skip the appendices without losing the main argument of the paper. 
2. The Baseline Modelling Framework
In this section we construct a real options model for employment under uncertainty. The stochastic 
framework contains the threshold effect induced by the “Protection Against Dismissal Act” to advance 
our understanding of the impact of the institutional setting. Like other real option models of this type, 
the optimal employment policy is a trigger strategy such that hirings and firings are initiated when the 
marginal product of labour reaches a critical threshold.4 We believe this to be an appropriate framework 
for understanding the impact of threshold levels for application of dismissal protection on employment, 
while still yielding tractable results. We first characterise the optimal employment strategy of an 
imperfect competitive firm subject to idiosyncratic shocks and firing and hiring costs, holding wages 
and productivity constant. The starting point is the Cobb-Douglas production function
(1)   1tt LAKY ,    10  ,
                                                          
3 In 2001 about two-third of all German establishments had 1 to 5 employees. See EUROSTAT (2001) for further 
details. According to the German Statistical Office even 91 percent of all German firms had 1-9 employees in 
2006 (see http://www.destatis.de/basis/d/insol/unternehmentab2.php). 
4 In its methodological approach, the model comes within the scope of the real options literature which has 
developed rapidly over the past decade. Reviews of this burgeoning literature are provided in Copeland and 
Antikarov (2001), Copeland and Tufano (2004), Coy (1999) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
3where K is the constant capital stock, tL  is the employment level,  is a parameter determining the 
shares between capital and labour in production, and A represents the level of technology. It is assumed
that the firm faces an isoelastic demand function subject to multiplicative demand shocks
(2)   tt ZYp  1 ,    1,
where p denotes the price, tY  is real output, tZ  denotes the multiplicative stochastic demand shock, 
and  is an elasticity parameter that takes its minimum value of 1 under perfect competition. Therefore, 
the profits at t, t , measured in units of output, are defined as
(3)  tttttt LMCwLLKZA ,211   ,
where  1  and     12 , twL denotes the total wage bills paid by the firm, tM  represents 
gross employment changes due to hiring or firing from employees, and C() are the total employment 
adjustment expenditures.5 For tractability purposes we choose the following smooth cost function for 
the threshold effects containing asymmetric fixed, proportional, and convex costs of adjusting 
employment in either direction [see Nilsen et al. (2003)]:
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There is an economic meaning behind these three cost components. (1) Hiring and firing employees 
incur some proportional positive unit costs of hiring and firing, hp  and fp , respectively.
6  Firing 
employees does generate some positive costs per employee: 0 tf Mp for 0tM . The positive 
unit costs of hiring and firing also reflect the (partial) irreversibility of employment changes; (2) the 
convex cost functions reflect the adjustment and disruptions to production processes; in case of 
asymmetric convex costs marginal cost of hiring are not the same as the marginal costs of firing; (3) the 
                                                          
5 In this paper, for the sake of simplicity, we specify adjustment costs as a function of gross employment changes, 
consistent with many papers in the literature [see, for example, Abowd and Kramarz (2003)]. For specifications 
based on both gross and net employment flows, see Hamermesh (1995).  
6 In the model we abstract from the choice of hours worked. For a real options framework with overtime and short 
time work, see Chen and Funke (2004).    
4fixed costs of hiring and firing are related to advertising and screening and are set up to a point 
independent of the number of people hired. The costs also include fixed costs of legal consultation and 
disputes in case of firings. In addition to explicit costs, a change in the level of employment is likely to 
involve implicit costs in terms of temporary productivity losses; (4) moreover, there are no costs as long 
as no hirings/firings are made, or equivalently, C(0) = 0.
The novelty of our model is that we allow for heterogeneity among firms by formalizing the threshold 
levels for application of dismissal protection which exist in many countries. We assume that the fixed 
cost of firing can be depicted by a three-parameter logistic function,   lLcf tec  02 1 , where l
denotes the threshold level for application of dismissal protection, 0c  is a scale parameter indicating the 
speed of such transition to the values of 
1f
c  and 
2f
c , which are the final size of fixed costs of firing
when L  is greater than l . By using this logistic function, changes in legislation can be accounted for in 
great detail. To see this, Figure 1 depicts the shape of the adjustment costs as a function of l and cf.
Figure 1: The fixed cost function     lLcf tecLf  02 1
4
A simple fixed cost of hiring, hc , is assumed for the hiring decision. Note that all parameters in 
equation (4) are assumed to be positive. Employment evolves according to 
(5) tt
t LM
dt
dL  ,
where  represents the deterministic quit rate. We assume that the multiplicative demand shock follows 
the geometric Brownian motion,
(6) tttt dWZdtZdZ   , 
cf2
l0 L
 Lf
5where tW  is a standard Wiener process with independent, normally distributed increments,  is the 
deterministic drift parameter, and   is the variance parameter.7   
The next task is to characterise the objective function of the firm. The firm chooses its optimal level of 
gross employment changes, tM , over time to maximise the intertemporal value of profits, subject to the 
employment stock accumulation [equation (5)] and the geometrical Brownian motion [equation (6)]. 
More precisely, we assume that the firm maximises the present discounted value of its stream of current 
and expected future profits, defined as:
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where E[·|t] denotes the mathematical expectation given the information set available to the firm at 
period t, t, r > 0 is the interest rate and twL  is the wage bill. Applying Ito’s Lemma, the stochastic 
nature of this optimization problem requires the solution to the following Bellman equation:
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where V represents the intertemporal value of the firm.8 Intuitively, equation (8) can be interpreted as 
follows: Should the option to hire be tradable and its risk diversifiable, then the expected value has to be 
equal to the foregone revenue from interest (rV). The first-order conditions for gross employment 
changes yield 
(9) vMp fhfh   , 
where LVv  . Note that the fixed costs of employment adjustment disappear in equation (9). However, 
the fixed costs of adjustment will enlarge the inaction area due to the fact that the firm only undertakes 
employment changes if a non-negative profit arises after deducting the fixed costs. It can be shown (see 
Appendix A) that hirings and firings occur when
                                                          
7 At this juncture an additional remark about this stochastic process is in place. A Brownian motion with a drift is 
the limit of a random walk with uneven probabilities for negative and positive changes. A positive (negative) drift 
implies that positive (negative) changes are more likely to occur than negative (positive) changes. The drift rate 
thus represents the bias of uncertainty. 
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The boundaries of the inaction area satisfy:
(12) hhh cpv 2  for hiring thresholds,
and
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The upper threshold can be derived by finding the value of v at which an additional worker generates 
non-negative profits. The lower threshold is found in a similar fashion. It is obvious that the higher the 
fixed costs of hiring/firing  fh cc , , the greater is the number of hiring/firing in these employment 
decisions and the wider is the inaction area. The firm does not hire/fire employees for the boundaries of  
fhpv  ; it waits until the numbers of hiring/firing reaching certain values to cover the non-trivial 
fixed costs of hiring/firing so that equations (9) are satistified. The adjustment speed-related parameters 
 fh  ,  also affect the numbers of hiring/firing. With a very small adjustment cost, the adjustment 
speeds increase and the firm tends to hire/fire more employees. The higher adjustment speeds due to 
smaller values of  fh  ,  also imply that the values of v do not deviate substantially from outside of 
fhpv  – a smaller inaction area.9
                                                                                                                                                                                       
8 In the case of reversible hiring decisions, the effect of future profits does not occur because earlier hirings can be 
withdrawn at any time. Thus, it is sufficient to consider the marginal product of labour at present time t only.
9 Note that contrary to the “now or never” decision in a traditional modelling framework with instantaneously and 
costlessly adjustable factors of production, the firm must choose the optimal time to fire or hire. This means that at 
every moment it must compare the continuation value, i.e. the value of the option when kept unexercised, and the 
value of an immediate firing or hiring decision.
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firm does not hire or fire employees simply because the benefits from employment changes are not 
large enough to cover the fixed costs of hiring or firing, or even the proportional unit costs of hiring or 
firing. We can consider that hhh cp 2  as effective marginal hiring costs when considering mass-
hiring, and    flLc
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The procedure in the Appendix A removes the nonlinear terms related to adjustment costs in Bellman
equations and transfers them into parts of the effective hiring and firing costs. Thus, we have the 
following analytically solvable differential equation for the boundaries of (mass-) hiring/firing 
decisions:
(14)    ZZZL vZZvLvwLZKAvr 22112 2
121     ,
where LZZ Vv  , LLL Vv   and LZZZZ Vv  . Equation (14), subject to the boundary conditions of 
equations (12) and (13), can be solved to obtain the hiring and firing thresholds  FH ZZ and  for the 
corresponding values of demand shocks.
After some algebra it can be shown (see Appendix B) that the particular solutions for v denoting the 
intertemporal marginal value of employees when no hiring and firing occurs takes the form
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and the general solutions for v representing the value of the real options to hire and fire are denoted by
(16)     221121 1211    LZKBLZKBqG ,
where 1B  and 2B  are two unknown positive variables to be determined by the boundary conditions –
the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions – and 1  and 2  are the positive and negative 
characteristic roots of the following equation, respectively:
(17)     01
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8The term   121 11  LZKB  is usually interpreted as the real option to hire and the term 
  221 12  LZKB is considered as the real option to fire. The value-matching and smooth-pasting 
conditions follow, and determine the thresholds of hiring and firing.10 Both conditions ensure that along 
the boundaries the firm is indifferent at the margin between an adjustment at date t and waiting dt to 
make the adjustment at date t + dt. The value-matching conditions are:
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The smooth-pasting conditions take the forms:
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Equations (18) - (21) consist of a non-linear system of four equations with four unknown variables, 
HZ , FZ , 1B  and 2B . Generally, numerical methods have to be adopted because closed-form solutions 
cannot be derived. In order to develop a “feel” for the model and to “draw a map” of the labour demand 
sensitivity to various structural characteristics of the environment in which firms operate, we calibrate 
parameters as follows. We interpret periods as years and annual rates are used where applicable. Where 
9possible, parameter values are drawn from empirical studies.11 Our base parameters are  = 0.2,  = 0, r
= 0.05,  = 0.05, 02.0hp , 06.0hc , 01.0h , 05.0fp , 01.01 fc , 29.02 fc , 5.0f , 
0.1000 c , 0.5l , K = 6.0,  = 0.3,  = 1.5 and A =1. In practice, measuring product market 
competition is a complex task. In our baseline parameter specification the price elasticity of demand 
parameter is set at  = 1.50 as in Bovenberg et al. (1998). The deterministic drift term  has been set to 
zero to avoid any “bias in uncertainty”. The labour share 1- (profit share ) is 0.7 (0.3). For simplicity, 
we normalise capital such that K = 6.0. This does not affect the qualitative results. We set A = 1 without 
loss of generality. The baseline threshold level for application of dismissal protection is l = 5. The 
choice of the remaining labour adjustment cost parameters can be explained as follows. Beyond the 
threshold l = 5, the effective firing costs should reach 0.6. 12  Our benchmark value of
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0.6; the effective hiring costs 0546.001.006.0202.02  hhh cp  are also in the range of 
0.06 as suggested by Bentolila and Bertola (1990). The corresponding hiring and firing M´s are 
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2 = - 1.09545 for firing after L > l
= 5. Figure 2 and 3 provide a graphical description of the pattern of employment adjustment for l  <  5
vs. l  <  10.
The intuitive graphs dichotomize the space spanned by Z shocks into action and inaction areas. In the 
inaction area the marginal reward for changing employment is insufficient: neither hiring nor firing is 
optimal. The comparison of Figure 2 and Figure 3 reveals what is happening when countries try to 
deregulate labour markets by shifting the threshold where dismissal protection will be effective from l = 
5  to l = 10. The widening of the inaction area beyond the threshold indicates that the “Protection 
Against Dismissal Act” reduces the propensity to hire and fire with respect to the unregulated world.13
The direct cost of employment protection makes adjustment of labour more expensive, which tends to 
lower firms´ willingness to hire. On the other hand, effective legal protection of existing employment 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
10 The value-matching conditions involve the value function, while the smooth-pasting conditions concern its first-
order derivatives.
11 It should be acknowledged that despite efforts to rely on multiple sources and datasets, there is inevitably an 
arbitrary and subjective aspect to some dimensions of the calibration. In particular, it is difficult to ascertain and 
quantify the extent of enforcement of statutory restrictions across firm sizes. We suggest taking an eclectic 
approach to capturing key economic features of policy interest. The basic idea is to choose coefficients that seem 
reasonable based on economic principles, available econometric evidence, and an understanding of the 
functioning of the economy, and then to look at how sensible the responses of the real options model are.
12 Our parameters convey the message in Bentolila and Bertola (1990). Their estimated firing costs for Germany 
are in the range of 0.562 to 0.750, and their hiring cost estimate (excluding on-the-job-training) for Germany is 
0.066 of the average annual wage.
13 The widening of the gap is consistent with the empirical evidence presented in Bauer et al. (2004) analysing 
worker flows in German establishments from March 1995 to March 1998 who have undergone periods of 
protection and non-protection as a consequence of the repeated changes in the German dismissal legislation.
10
relationships lowers the occurrence of firing during recessions. As firing and hiring incentives work in 
opposite directions, the impact of tighter or softened adjustment costs for labour is theoretically 
ambiguous. Bentolila and Bertola (1990) and Bertola (1992) have demonstrated in real option models 
that the overall impact depends, inter alia, upon the size of the adjustment costs, the functional forms 
and the discount rate. Our numerical findings verify the conjecture that the overall effect is a reduction 
of the speed of adjustment to shocks, but for fixed wages ww   the net effect turns out to be mostly 
positive. In other words, the simulations imply that firing costs have more of an effect on the firing 
decision than on the hiring decision, thereby increasing long-term employment.14
Figure 2: The Effects of Dismissal Protection Regulation with Exempted Establishment L  <  5
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Figure 3: The Effects of Dismissal Protection Regulation with Exempted Establishment L  < 10
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Focusing on the results close to the thresholds, the calibration results indicate that the anticipation of 
future firing costs may have current effects for a hiring firm even when the more stringent firing regime 
beyond the threshold is absent at the time of decision making. Elaborating on this idea and using our 
formal theoretical model of labour demand decisions under uncertainty, the results in Figure 2 and 3 
indicate that latent legal constraints can affect firms´ employment policy even when these firing 
                                                          
14 Pissarides (2001) has outlined another mechanism. He has shown that dismissal protection might increase 
welfare by providing insurance against unemployment.
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constraints are currently slack. The numerical calibrations elegantly demonstrate this, as the outcome of 
a forward-looking behaviour by the small firm that expects future legal constraints to bind, resulting in 
current employment decisions to be a function both of the current legal framework but also expectations 
about their more stringent future path after growing beyond the threshold. 
The main conclusion of the previous analysis is that firing costs beyond some thresholds tend to reduce 
both dismissals and hirings. Therefore, the net impact upon employment is theoretically indeterminate. 
This notwithstanding, the effects of employment protection are likely to be different across firm size.
We are aware of the many caveats that such ceteris-paribus comparison can arise. A first concern is that 
tighter employment regulations may diminish company´s ability to cope with a rapidly changing 
environment driven by globalisation, technical progress, and organisational change. Caballero et al. 
(2004) have demonstrated that job security legislation hampers the creative-destruction process and 
lowers productivity growth. The clear and robust result is that tight job security regulations lower 
annual productivity growth somewhere between 0.8 and 1.2 percent. Samaniego (2006) has 
demonstrated in a theoretical model that high firing costs slow the diffusion of new technologies via the 
mobility of entrepreneurial resources. Therefore firing costs are particularly detrimental in industries in 
which the rate of technical progress is rapid. Autor et al. (2007) have tested the theoretical prediction 
that firms facing firing costs will curtail hiring below efficient levels in a boom and retain unproductive 
workers in a recession, both of which should affect productivity, using plant-level data for the US. The 
microdata indicate that an increase in adjustment costs decreases efficiency (TFP). Finally, Acemoglu et 
al. (2006) and Colecchia (2002) have also demonstrated in an independent literature that a more 
competitive institutional setting will contribute to a more innovative and dynamic economy through 
thriving entrepreneurial activity. Although these studies did not use the same methodology as in this 
paper, their results which are based on theoretical models and regressions reveal a similar story as the 
one below.
In order to gauge the costs of job security provisions with endogenous creative destruction processes, 
we adapt our baseline real options model and assume that the level of aggregate productivity A is a 
function of total effective employment adjustment costs (TEEA), i.e. the magnitude of the inaction area:
(22)
TEEAA
A  01
1
,
where TEEA = hhh cp 2 +    flLc
f
ff
e
c
cp 




  0
2
1 1
2 .
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Table 1: The Value of Productivity, A, for Different A0 and Regulation Regimes (l=10)
L < 10 L  10
A0=0.08 0.9917 0.9504
A0=0.16 0.9835 0.9055
A0=0.24 0.9755 0.8646
The implications of employment-protection-induced productivity changes upon the inaction area for l = 
10 are summarised graphically in Figure 4 for A0 = 0.08, A0 = 0.16, and A0 = 0.24, respectively.
15 Taking 
this productivity impact into account implies that contrary to the baseline model labour market 
regulations could indeed be a barrier to employment.
Figure 4: The Inaction Area with Employment-Protection-Induced Productivity Changes for l=10
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A second concern is that wages in the baseline model have been fixed although much of the debate of 
persistent unemployment in European economies has focused on the wage formation systems. Caballero 
and Hammour (1998) have shown that dismissal protection legislation like any other mandatory 
employment protection measure creates a hold-up problem enabling insiders (incumbent workers) to 
bid up wages once they are employed.16 In other words, firing costs make it difficult for firms to fire 
workers, so firms hesitate to hire them in the first place, strengthening the hand of unions bargaining 
with firms to set a wage. Contrary to the traditional literature holding wages fixed and looking at the 
employment effect of different degrees of job security provisions, we therefore adapt our model to an 
insider-outsider mechanism where firing costs increase the bargaining power of incumbent workers 
[see, e.g., Díaz-Vázquez and Snower (2003) and Lindbeck and Snower (1988)].17 Explicitly modelling 
                                                          
15 In the simulations we assume that the extra gains in productivity will not be eroded by higher wages. The 
deregulated labour market and the threat that jobs in advanced economies could move abroad may help to hold 
wages down.
16 In countries with higher firing costs a large share of workers with fixed-term contracts tends to insulate insiders 
(permanent workers) from adjustment, thereby increasing their bargaining power.
17 Lazear (1990) has claimed that the non-wage labour costs arising from mandatory dismissal protection will be 
offset by an efficient contract or bargaining process (in the sense that they do not influence equilibrium 
unemployment, just equilibrium wages). However, labour markets are imperfect and wages are fairly rigid. It is 
therefore unlikely that dismissal costs are written into labour contracts ex-ante.  
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the endogenous response of heterogeneous firms will help to deepen our understanding of how firms, 
industries and economies respond to policy reforms such as deregulation. For simplicity and for clarity 
of exposition we assume that wages are determined as
(23)   EFCrw  1 ,
where EFC denotes effective firing costs depicted in  =    flLc
f
ff
e
c
cp 




  0
2
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2 . Equation 
(23) constitutes an additional “wage mechanism” in the regulation transmission channel and can be seen 
as encompassing various sources of wage rigidity. While being a short cut to a strictly micro founded 
wage equation, equation (23) constitutes a plausible starting point for analysing the impact of 
endogenous wages on the regulation transmission process. Figure 5 reports the numerical results of this 
experiment for A0 = 0.08, A0 = 0.16, and A0 = 0.24, respectively.
Figure 5: Hiring and Firing Thresholds with Endogenous Wages for l = 10
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Adjustment costs of labour again induce firms to hoard labour during recessions, and also to hire fewer 
workers during boom periods. Contrary to the baseline model, however, the shape of the firing cost 
profiles implies that the insider-outsider considerations provide a channel through which the impact of 
firing costs is pulled, via wages, towards a negative impact on average employment.18
In this Section we have provided some tests of the sensitivity and robustness of the baseline model. 
Taken together, the augmented model follows a more pronounced deregulatory line. Of course, the 
endogenous productivity and wage effects are hard to quantify. Nevertheless, the paper shows that they 
are important channels through which employment protection might affect macroeconomic aggregates 
and therefore they are the ones that should be the focus of attention.   
                                                          
18 This result confirms the “all or nothing” warning issued by Coe and Snower (1997) and Orszag and Snower 
(1998). They argue that piecemeal labour market reforms may have had so little success because they disregarded 
the complementarities between a broad range of policies and institutions. The findings of both papers are drawn 
from distinctly different frameworks than our modelling approach. The parallels with our findings are nonetheless 
intriguing.
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3. Temporary Work Agencies (Zeitarbeit)
Next, we consider other forms of employment which increase the flexibility of the labour market. In 
particular, we are modelling the contribution of temporary employment agencies. This is still a blank 
cell in the real options modelling literature.
Temporary agency work can broadly be defined as a temporary employment relationship between a 
temporary work agency, which is the employer, and a worker, where the latter is assigned to work for, 
and under the control of a firm making use of his/her services. In order to provide the background of 
flexible employment, some information about the institutional settings in Germany is provided in the 
next paragraph.19    
The number of workers employed in temporary employment agencies (Zeitarbeiter) has increased in 
Germany as a consequence of deregulation of this sector in the 1990s.20 Already in August 1972, the 
Bundestag passed the Act on Temporary Employment Business (Arbeitnehmerüberlassungsgesetz). In 
1985, the Recruitment Promotion Act (Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz) prolonged the maximum 
‘hiring out’-period to one firm from three to six months. In January 1994, the maximum ‘hiring out’-
period was extended to nine months. The posted work period was then extended stepwise to 12 months 
in 1997, to 2 years in 2002, and finally the limit was completely abolished in 2003 – except the ban of 
temporary employment agencies in the construction sector. Since then there are no legal limitations to 
signing overlapping temporary contracts for any worker at the same firm. The labour market reform 
therefore brought about the creation of a dual contract system in Germany in which temporary workers 
create a buffer peripheral workforce as a hedge against market uncertainty.
How can we model the atypical form of Zeitarbeit enabling quick (external) employment adjustments in 
client firms?21 In the context of uncertainty about the state of the economy in the future, the firm faces 
the problem of deciding the optimal number of workers, where there are two types of labour contracts: 
standard open-ended contracts and Zeitarbeit contracts. In order to model the interplay between external 
and internal work force adjustments, we adopt the Cobb-Douglas production function with constant 
returns to scale and two types of workers
                                                          
19 German labour law defines the hiring-out of labour as a legal relationship where a business lends temporarily an 
employee with whom it had concluded a permanent employment contract to another employer while the legal 
relationship with the first one continues to apply and the employee is obliged to work for the company and in line 
with the instructions of the hiring-out employer. Because the employment agency remains the employer of 
temporary agency workers, social benefits carry over from one assignment to another. In addition, relevant labour 
laws (social security schemes, paid holidays, maternity leave) fully apply to temporary agency work.
20 The up-to-date BMW factory in Leipzig is an example. In all, 5,200 workers are in the plant of whom 1,300 are 
Zeitarbeiter hired from an agency. Again we use Germany as an example but the German experience isn´t unique. 
Several other countries have similar and in some cases even more of those types of employment. In the EU about 
7 million workers are currently employed by private employment agencies. Neugart and Storrie (2006) show that 
the improvement in the matching technology of temorary work agencies may lead to the emergence and growth of 
temporary work. 
21 An alternative to external forms of flexibility is provided by internal working time flexibility (overtime, short 
time work). For an analysis of working time flexibility in a real options framework, see Chen and Funke (2004). 
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(24)  ttt NLAKY
 1 ,    1,0   ,
where N represents the number of temporary employees and   denotes the share of temporary 
employees in the production function.22 Combined with equation (2), we have the following immediate 
profit function,
(25)  tttNtttt LMCNwwLNLKZA ,3211   ,
where Nw  is the wages for temporary employees,  1 ,     12 , and  3 . 
Zeitarbeiter get wages of around 75 percent of permanent workers on average but the cost to the hiring 
company is much more than that because it must pay the agency its cut on top of the wage that goes to 
the workers, i.e. we have Nww  .
One motivation for temporary hirings is that they can be terminated at the end of their term at low cost 
or no cost at all. It is therefore assumed that there are no hiring and/or firing costs for N. Thus,  C  is 
not a function of N and we do not need to consider the real options term for N due to no sunk costs from 
hiring/firing Zeitarbeit employees. The firms´ optimal temporary and permanent employment levels are 
obtained maximising the expected discounted value of the firms´ future cash flows. The first order 
condition for N is a function of Z and L:
(26) .
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As Z moves to hiring thresholds, the firm increases its level of N and raise the hiring threholds above
the ones of the case without temporary employment. Similarly, as Z falls, the firm initially reduces the 
number of temporary workers which dampens the need to fire permanent workers. The effect of 
introducing temporary workers indeed serves as buffer and widens the inaction area. The discussion
means that before the firm takes any actions of hiring and firing, it first and continuously adjust its level 
of N to optimise profits. In other words, the optimal N for hiring and firing decisions are considered as
constants since it is determined first before the decisions of hiring and firing. Therefore, the value-
matching conditions of hiring and firing of equations (18) and (19) become
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conditions follows by differentiating equations (30) and (31) with respect to hiring and firing thresholds 
respectively.
We are now able to say something about the relationship between employment protection thresholds 
and Zeitarbeit. Using available evidence for Germany on wages for temporary employees and on the 
average temproary work to regular work ratio, our calibrated parameters are wwN 4.1 and 05.0 .
Figure 6: The Effects of Dismissal Protection Regulation with Zeitarbeit
and Exempted Establishment L  <  5 vs. L < 10
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Note: The solid lines give the no action areas for the case with temporary employment (Zeitarbeit); the dashed 
lines provide the baseline framework without temporary work (see Figure 2 and 3). 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
22 In the setup we therefore assume that both categories of workers are close substitutes. For the sake of realism 
one might argue that a CES function might be more appropriate. Chen and Funke (2004, 2007) have demonstrated 
that replacing the CD by a CES production function doesn´t change any qualitative conclusion.
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Focusing again on the thresholds, the calibration results in Figure 6 indicate that Zeitarbeit leads to 
higher hiring and firing thresholds for permanent workers across all firm sizes. Thus, temporary 
workers create a buffer peripheral workforce as a hedge against market uncertainty. This 
notwithstanding, the effects of employment protection are different across firm size. Ocular inspection 
indicates that the widening of the no action areas at the thresholds l = 5 vs. l = 10 is more pronounced in 
case of Zeitarbeit being available. In other words, the results support the prediction that more extensive 
employment protection mandates for standard employment contracts increases the incentives for firms 
to hire temporary workers. Therefore, the main conclusion of the previous analysis is that Zeitarbeit is 
positively correlated with permanent employment protection.
4. The Cyclicality and Dynamics of Employment 
Since the focus of the paper is employment, we next present a translation from thresholds to 
employment and assess the impact of alternative thresholds upon L. In order to get a clear “feel” for the 
dynamics of the model, we first have to specify a solution method that will lead us to generate discrete 
realizations of the level of employment, given the chosen levels of parameters. Several options are 
available at this point, but the structure of the model readily suggests using a sequential iterations 
method. It works as follows. Equation (6) is proxied by the following discrete stochastic differential 
equation - the Euler scheme,
(29) tZtZZZ ttttt  1 ,   1;0~ Nt ,
where the normal random variables, t , are generated via the central limit theorem and the Box-Muller 
(1958) method for transforming a uniformly distributed random variables to a normal distribution with 
given mean and variance and t  represents small changes in t.
As long as the discrete time series values for tZ wander within the inaction area, the firm does nothing 
– no hires or fires – except for natural attrition of employees due to quits. Once tZ  hits the hiring 
thresholds, the firm then hires tctM hh  2  employees according to equation (10) for each step 
of t , and the changes of employees are governed and proxied by the following equation,
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which is discrete-time version of equation (5) with hhcM 2 . Similarly, if tZ  hits the firing 
thresholds, the firm is then starting to fire     tecc flLcff   021 12  [from equation (11)], and 
the process of changes of employees is denoted by the following equation,
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Note that equations (30) and (31) are approximate equations since beyond the thresholds – outside of 
the inaction regime, the hires and fires for period t are bound to be greater than tc hh 2  and 
    tecc flLcff   021 12 , respectively. Note that the thresholds for hiring and firing are 
changing at every time step since tL  changes over time due to quits as well as possible hiring or firing.
We first concentrate upon the benchmark model without Zeitarbeit. Figures 7 and 8 demonstrate the 
dynamic effect of an unanticipated change in l upon the employment level over time. The average path 
of employment in each Figure is averaged from 5000 Monte Carlo simulations over a 15 year period 
with .....t , ....0 Z  and inital value of l = 5.23 All other parameters are the same as the benchmark 
values except the unanticipated change from l = 5 to l = 10 at t = 5. Figure 7 shows the dynamic impact 
of this policy change for exogenous wages (w = 1), while Figure 8 focuses on the effect with 
endogenous wages and A0 = 0.24.
24
The reforms can be seen as labour markets which have been partly freed up, to capture what has been
the German experience. The graphs suggest that employment increases on average after the policy 
change, i.e. firms hire more and fire less once the regulation is relaxed at t = 5. The comparison of 
Figure 7 and 8 reveals that the increase in employment is larger for the scenario with endogenous 
wages. The underlying reason is that the new regime (l = 10) reduces the rigidities in the wage-
bargaining process. Insiders feel less insulated and therefore demand lower wages in the awareness that 
any resultant job losses will also fall on insiders.  
                                                          
23 Experimentation with larger numbers of runs shows no significant change to the results.
24 We ignore behavioural assumptions regarding market rivalry, which in turn would necessitate some kind of 
game-theoretic analysis to take account of the strategic interactions among the firms, results of which are in turn 
heavily dependent on assumptions regarding the information sets available and the type of game being played. 
The ramifications of competitive interaction on the decision making of firms have been discussed by Leahy 
(1993). Leahy (1993) has shown that the assumption of myopic firms who ignore the impact of other firms´ 
actions results in the same critical boundaries that trigger factor demand as a model in which firms correctly 
anticipate the strategies of other firms. Grenadier (2002) has recently extended Leahy´s (1993) “Principle of 
Optimality of Myopic Behavior” to the apparently more complex case of dynamic oligopoly under uncertainty. 
Both papers therefore permit to bypass strategic general equilibrium considerations when analysing factor demand 
under uncertainty. An alternative way forward is the general equilibrium version of the Bentolila-Bertola model 
solved by Hopenhavn and Rogerson (1993).
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Figure 7: The Effect of Changes in l on Average Employment L with Exogenous Wages
5.5
6
6.5
7
7.5
8
0 2.5 5 7.5 10 12.5 15
Time
A
ve
ra
g
e 
L
No endoginised wages, No Insider-Outsider effect
L  (l  =10 after t =5)
L  (l  =5)
Figure 8: The Effect of Changes in l on Average Employment L with Endogenous Wages
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Finally, we will analyse the cyclicality of temporary agency work. How do the two types of labour input 
respond to shocks? Figure 9 demonstrates the dynamic effect of Zeitarbeit upon employment, using the 
previous algorithim with constant w = 1, wwN 4.1 , and l = 5. When comparing the bold line (only 
permanent employment contracts) with the dashed line (permanent employment contracts and 
temporary agency work), it can be seen that permanent employment and Zeitarbeit exhibit strikingly 
different cyclical behaviour with Zeitarbeit being more volatile.25 Employers use temporary agency 
work to overcome short-term demand peaks instead of hiring workers on normal employment contracts, 
i.e. firms use the peripheral workforce as a buffer. An important conclusion is that the ratio of 
temporary to permanent workers increases after positive shocks and decreases after negative shocks. 
                                                          
25 This is consistent with Messina and Vallanti (2005) showing that more stringent firing restrictions dampen the 
response of job destruction and job creation to business cycles in 14 European countries.
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The implication is that the peripheral workforce is more strongly exposed to shocks while the job 
security of the (smaller) core workforce is tightened. In this spirit, temporary employment agencies 
facilitate flexibility and the core-periphery hypothesis is supported.  
Figure 9: The Effect of Zeitarbeit on the Dynamic Path of Employment with  = 0.05 and  = 0.65
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5. Conclusions
Attitudes and policies towards deregulation of labour markets have been subject to considerable 
controversy and flux. Our paper fits neatly into this debate, and provides some fresh evidence on labour 
demand dynamics associated with asymmetric job security provisions across the firm size distribution. 
There has been considerable debate among politicians, unions, employer associations and economists 
about dismissal protection legislation. To contribute to this debate, we have designed and presented an 
economically meaningful and transparent dynamic model in continuous time characterizing the firm´s 
optimal behaviour under uncertainty. While highly stylised, the real options model singles out 
important transmission channels and allows policy-makers to study the implications of policy 
interventions in alternative model specifications. We have analysed the impact of employment 
protection legislation on the incidence of regular and temporary hirings, firings, and employment. We 
have argued on theoretical and numerical grounds that protection will tend to lower the incidence of 
regular contracts and increases the input of Zeitarbeit. 
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Appendix A: The Boundaries of the Inaction Area
By substituting (9) in the text back into the Bellman equation (8) in the text and rearranging we obtain 
for the hiring and firing decisions:
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The firm would hire/hire marginal employees only if the total revenue net costs of hiring/hiring are non-
negative. Thus, for hiring decision  0M , the firm has benefit of hiring M employees – the value of 
the firm increases by Mv ; for hiring those M employees, the firm pays the total cost of employment for 
hiring. The hiring decisions would only happen for a certain M or greater as long as the following 
equation is satisfied:
(A3) 0
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In economic downturns, the firm endures a loss so that the value of v  is negative. By firing M
employees  0M , the loss of the firm is reduced by Mv , which is considered to be the benefit of 
firing M  empoyees; the firing also incurs some total cost of adjustment. The firm only fire a certain 
number of employees or more if the following relationship is satisfied:
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Multiplying both sides of (9) in the text by M  and substituting into (A3) and (A4) gives
h
hcM 
22   for hiring,
and 
   flLc
f
f
e
c
cM 




  0
2
1 1
22  for firing.
Thus, for (mass-) hiring starting thresholds, we shall have
(A5) 0
2 
h
hcM  ;
and for (mass-) firing starting thresholds, we need the following relationship
(A6)    012 021 




  flLc
f
f
e
c
cM  .
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Substituting (A5) and (A6) back into equation (9) in the text respectively gives the hiring/firing regimes 
for the intertemporal marginal value of the firm
hhh cpv 2   for hiring regime,
and 
   flLc
f
ff
e
c
cpv 




  0
2
1 1
2  for firing regime. 
The boundaries of the inaction area or the beginning points of hiring and firing regimes, where 
equations hold, are then determined by the following two equations.
(A7) hhh cpv 2  for hiring thresholds, 
and 
(A8)    flLc
f
ff
e
c
cpv 




  0
2
1 1
2  for firing thresholds.
Substituting (A7) and (A8) back into Bellman equations (A1) and (A2) gives the following unified 
differential equations for hiring and firing:
(A9)  ZZZt VZZVvLwLLZKArV
221
2
121   .
Using the definitions LVv  , LZZ Vv  , LLL Vv   and LZZZZ Vv   and differentiating both sides of 
equation (A9) with respect to L yields
(A10)    ZZZL vZZvLvwLZKAvr 22112 2
121     ,
which is equation (14) in the text.
Appendix B: The Particular and General Solutions for v
Particular solutions
Assume that the particular solutions have the following functional form:
(B1) bLaZKv P  121  ,
We then have the following relationships:
(B2) 121   LZKaZvZ ,
(B3) 0ZZv ,
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(B4)   12 211   LZKaLvL .
Substituting into equation (14) in the text gives:
(B5)        01122 21   wbrLZKAra   .
The above equation should hold for any value of marginal product of employees. Thus, we have 
(B6)  
 


2
1
2
r
A
a ,
(B7)  


r
w
b ,
which yields the particular solution (15) in the text.
Homogenous solutions
The homogenous part of equation (14) in the text is represented by 
(B6)    ZZZL vZZvLvvr 222
1  .
The homogenous solutions should have the same components as in particular solutions. Therefore, 
assume the following functional form for homogenous solutions:
(B7)   121  LZKBv H ,
where A is constant and to be determined by value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions. We then 
have the following relationships for homogenous solutions:
(B8)   121  LZKBZvZ ,
(B9)     1222 211
2
1
2
1  LZKBvZ ZZ ,
(B10)     12 211  LZKBLvL .
Substituting into equation (B6) and rearranging gives:
(B11)      01
2
1
1 22  r ,
which is (17) in the text. There are two characteristic roots for : one positive and one negative:  
21 0   . Therefore, the homogenous (general) solutions are shown as follows:
24
(B12)     221121 1211    LZKBLZKBv H ,
which corresponds to real options to hire and fire employees respectively, and is equation (16) in the 
text.
References:
Abowd, J.M. and F. Kramarz (2003) “The Cost of Hirings and Separations”, Labour Economics 10, 
499-530.
Acemoglu, D., Aghion, P. and Zilibotti, F. (2006) “Distance to Frontier, Selection, and Economic 
Growth”, Journal of the European Economic Association 4, 37-74.
Autor, D.H., Kerr, W.R. and A.D. Kugler (2007) “Do Employment Protections Reduce Productivity? 
Evidence from U.S. States”, The Economic Journal 117, 189-217.
Bentolila, S. and G. Bertola (1990) “Firing Costs and Labor Demand: How Bad is Eurosclerosis?”, 
Review of Economic Studies 57, 381-402.
Bertola, G. (1992) “Labor Turnover Costs and Average Labor Demand”, Journal of Labor Economics 
10, 389-402.
Botero, J.C., Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and A. Shleifer (2004) “The regulation of 
Labor”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, 1339-1382.
Bovenberg, A.L., J.J. Graafland and R.A. de Mooij (1998) Tax Reform and the Dutch Labor Market: 
An Applied General Equilibrium Approach, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, 
Research Memorandum 143, The Hague.
Box, G. and M. Muller (1958) “A Note on the Generation of Random Normal Variables”, Annals of 
Mathematical Statistics, 29, 610–611.
Caballero, R.J., Cowan, K.N., Engel, E.M.R.A. and A. Micco (2004) “Effective Labour Regulation and 
Microeconomic Flexibility”, NBER Working Paper No. 10744, Cambridge (Mass.). 
Caballero, R.J. and M.L. Hammour (1998) “The Macroeconomics of Specificity”, Journal of Political 
Economy 106, 724-767. 
Chen, Y.-F. and M. Funke (2004) „Working Time and Employment Under Uncertainty“, Studies in 
Nonlinear Dynamics and Econometrics 8, Issue 3, Article 5 (www.bepress.com/snde/vol8/iss3/art5).
Chen, Y.-F. and M. Funke (2008) “Product Market Competition, Investment and Employment-
Abundant versus Job-Poor Growth: A Real Options Perspective”, European Journal of Political 
Economy (forthcoming).
Coe, D. and Snower, D.J. (1997) “Policy Complementarities: The Case for Fundamental Labour Market 
Reform”, IMF Staff Papers 44, 1-35.
Colecchia, A. (2002) “ICT Investment and Economic Growth in the 1990s: Is the United States a 
Unique Case?”, Review of Economic Dynamics 5, 408-442.
Copeland, T. and V. Antikarov (2001) Real Options – A Practitioner´s Guide, London (Texere 
Publishing).
25
Copeland, T. and P. Tufano (2004) “A Real-World Way to Manage Real Options”, Harvard Business 
Review, March 2004, 90-99.
Coy, R. (1999) "Exploiting Uncertainty: The Real-Options Revolution in Decision-Making", Business 
Week, June 7, 118-124.
Díaz-Vázquez, P. and D.J. Snower (2003) “Can Insider Power Affect Employment”, German Economic 
Review 4, 139-150.
Dixit, A. and R.S. Pindyck (1994) Investment Under Uncertainty, Princeton (Princeton University 
Press).
EUROSTAT (2001) Enterprises in Europe, Luxembourg.
Grenadier, S.R. (2002) “Option Exercise Games: An Application to the Equilibrium Investment 
Strategies of Firms”, Review of Financial Studies 15, 691-721. 
Hamermesh, D.S. (1995) “Labor Demand and the Source of Adjustment Costs”, The Economic Journal 
105, 620-634.
Hopenhayn, H. and R. Rogerson (1993) “Job Turnover and Policy Evaluation: A General Equilibrium 
Analysis”, Journal of Political Economy 101, 915-938.
Leahy, J. (1993) “Investment in Competitive Equilibrium: The Optimality of Myopic Behaviour”, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, 1105-1133.
Lindbeck, A. and D.J. Snower (1988) The Insider-Outsider Theory of Employment Protection, 
Cambridge (MIT Press).
Messina, J. and G. Vallanti (2005) “Job Flow Dynamics and Firing Restrictions: Evidence from 
Europe”, ECB Working Paper No. 602, Frankfurt.
Neugart, M. and D. Storrie (2006) “The Emergence of Temporary Work Agencies”, Oxford Economic 
Papers 58, 137-156. 
Nilsen, A., Salvanes, K.G. and F. Schiantarelli (2003) “Employment Changes, the Structure of 
Adjustment Costs, and Plant Size”, IZA Discussion Paper No. 920, Bonn.
OECD (2004) OECD Employment Outlook, Paris.
Orszag, M. and Snower, D.J. (1998) “Anatomy of Policy Complementarities”, Swedish Economic 
Policy Review 5, 303-343.
Pissarides, C. (2001) “Employment Protection”, Labour Economics 8, 131-159. 
Samaniego, R.M. (2006) “Employment Protection and High-Tech Aversion”, Review of Economic 
Dynamics 9, 224-241.
